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Abstract
This paper derives a preemptive equilibrium in strategic investment in alternative
projects. The problem is formulated in a real options model with a multidimensional
state variable that represents project-speci¯c uncertainty. The proposed method enables
us to evaluate the value of potential alternatives. The results not only extend previous
studies with a one-dimensional state variable but also reveal new ¯ndings. Preemptive
investment takes place earlier and the project value becomes lower if the numbers of both
¯rms and projects increase by the same amount. Interestingly, a strong correlation among
pro¯ts from projects, unlike in a monopoly, plays a positive role in moderating preemptive
competition.
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1 Introduction
The global ¯nancial crisis that began in 2007 has increased uncertainty about future
market demand in industries throughout the world. It is becoming increasingly important
for ¯rm project management to take into account uncertainty and °exibility in the future.
The real options approach, in which option pricing theory is applied to capital budgeting
decisions, better enables us to ¯nd an optimal investment strategy and project valuation
involving such uncertainty and °exibility than the Net Present Value (NPV) method could
(see [4]).
Although the early literature on real options investigated monopolists' investment
decisions, recent studies have investigated the problem of several ¯rms competing in the
same market from a game theoretic approach. Many studies, such as [6, 9, 16], analyze
the preemptive equilibrium in a duopoly investment game.1 Their main result, that
competition among ¯rms accelerates investment in a project, has been supported by
empirical papers such as [14].
Most studies of strategic real options assume one-dimensional Geometric Brownian
Motion (GBM) to be the stochastic process (called the state variable) representing the
future cash °ow from a project. This is because explicit results are more appealing due to
the di±culty of model calibration in many real options models. Although such simpli¯-
cation could be justi¯ed for a problem concerning a single investment project, a problem
involving several projects should be modelled by a multidimensional state variable instead
of a one-dimensional state variable. In fact, several papers have investigated a monopo-
list's investment decision involving several projects in a model with a bidimensional state
variable. For example, [5] investigated land development timing with an alternative land
use choice and [11] investigated timing in switching methods of nuclear waste disposal.2
To the best of my knowledge, however, there are no papers that investigate preemp-
tive investment involving several projects with a multidimensional state variable.3 The
contribution of the paper is to ¯rst clarify the preemptive equilibrium in an investment
game by several ¯rms with alternative projects, using a multidimensional state variable.
This paper shows several properties of the investment region and the option value in a
1In [7, 10] derived the equilibrium strategies in a Cournot{Nash framework instead of the preemption game.
The competitive equilibrium where the output price moves between upper and lower barriers has also been
investigated in [4, 17]. On the other hand, [8, 13, 15] investigated the agency problem in a single ¯rm by the
method of mechanism design.
2These studies apply the results of ¯nancial options for multiple assets (see Chapter 6 in [3]) to capital
budgeting. Although in several papers a problem with a bidimensional state variable is reduced to a one-
dimensional case by homogeneity, such cases are very restrictive.
3One paper, [1], conducted a case study on the preemptive competition in the textile industry with three
types of uncertainty, but the preemptive game is essentially modelled on the one-dimensional state variable. So,
theoretically, their paper is no di®erent from the previous papers [6, 9, 16].
1
model where ¯rms optimize both investment time and project choice among remaining
projects that have not been chosen by the leading competitors.
The use of this model is also motivated by the following practical issue. When we
evaluate the value of a project by the real options method, we are often puzzled by the
question of which value in monopolistic and strategic models is reliable. Indeed, the
di®erence is likely to be quite large because the theoretical models with a one-dimensional
state variable calculate the extreme values. This paper provides us with a useful criterion
toward solving such a problem. That is, we should evaluate the value of considering a
potential alternative in a strategic model with a multidimensional state variable. I ¯nd
that the strategic option values with a symmetric alternative are 40% » 60% of monopoly
with two alternative projects, or equivalently, 70% » 80% of monopoly with a single
project.
Furthermore, I show that preemptive investment takes place earlier and the option
value becomes lower if the numbers of both ¯rms and projects increase by the same
amount. It is intuitively explained that in the preemptive equilibrium all the ¯rms are
dragged into a scenario with the worst project. Taking into account the fact that the
number of competitors is likely to increase with the number of alternatives, the result
seems consistent with empirical studies on strategic real options such as [14].
Another new ¯nding is that preemptive competition is moderated by the correlation
among pro¯ts from projects. This contrasts with the monopoly situation where strong
correlation among cash °ows decreases the value of project choice. Thus, the sensitiv-
ity of the correlation with project value in an oligopoly depends on a trade-o® between
moderation of the preemptive competition (positive e®ect) and a decrease in the value of
project choice (negative e®ect). In particular, when there are as many projects as ¯rms,
the competition deprives ¯rms of the value of project choice and hence a strong correlation
increases the option value.
Finally, let me mention several applications of the model in this paper. As mentioned
above, the model is suitable for strategic investment involving several alternatives. An
example is a war among ¯rms opening new stores. A follower must open a store in a
di®erent place or of a di®erent type from that of the leader. In the situation where big
¯rms ¯ght for market share in emerging countries, an alternative to preemptive entry into
the market in India might be preemption into the market in the Republic of South Africa.
The model also applies to M&A struggles. For instance, in the pharmaceutical indus-
try large corporations strategically acquire venture businesses that develop new drugs.
Because many M&As take place by private negotiation rather than through a public bid-
ding process, it is necessary for a ¯rm to preempt the competitors. In the pharmaceutical
industry numerous potential targets generate a low correlation in gains in takeovers, and
then severe preemptive competition occurs.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the setup and the preliminary
results in three cases; a monopoly with a single project, a duopoly with a single project,
and a monopoly with two alternative projects. Section 3 describes the new results. In
particular I present the details in a duopoly with two projects, though the results can be
extended to an oligopoly of n ¯rms with m projects in Section 3.3. The results of the
investment region and the project value contrasts a duopoly or oligopoly with a monopoly.
Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
Consider a risk-neutral4 ¯rm that has an option to invest in a project. Consider two
kinds of projects denoted by i = 1; 2. When a ¯rm conducts project i at time t with sunk
cost Ii(> 0), it receives a temporary pro¯t Xi(t).5 Assume that the pro¯t Xi(t) follows a
continuous di®usion process:
dXi(t) = ¹i(Xi(t); t)dt+ ¾i(Xi(t); t)dBi(t); (1)
where (B1(t); B2(t)) is a two-dimensional Brownian Motion (BM) with correlation coe±-
cient ½. Mathematically, the model is built on the ¯ltered probability space (­;F ; P ;Ft)
generated by (B1(t); B2(t)) as usual. The set Ft means the available information set to
time t, and a ¯rm optimizes its investment strategy under this information. Let r(> 0)
and T (> 0) denote the constant risk-free rate and maturity of the option throughout the
paper. We may take T =1 when we consider a perpetual option, as in many real options
models.
2.1 Monopoly with a single project
As a benchmark, we consider a ¯rm that has a monopolistic option to invest in a single
project, i. It is well known that the option value at time t(· T ) with the state variable
Xi(t) = xi is equal to the value function of the following optimal stopping problem:
V 1i (xi; t) = sup
¿2Tt
Exit [e
¡r(¿¡t)(Xi(¿)¡ Ii)1f¿·Tg]; (2)
where Tt denotes the set of all stopping times ¿ satisfying ¿ ¸ t and Exit [¢] is the expecta-
tion conditional on Xi(t) = xi.6 Throughout the paper, the superscript and the subscript
on V 1i represent the number of ¯rms and available project(s), respectively; that is, V
1
i in
(2) means the value function in a monopoly with a single project i.
Many di®usions satisfy the following properties.
4Generally we can assume risk-adjusted pro¯t dynamics (1) rather than the risk-neutrality assumption.
5The pro¯t can be interpreted as the discounted cash °ow during the lifetime of the project.
6We do not consider 1f¿·1g but 1f¿<1g in the case of T =1 throughout the paper.
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Assumption (i) The value function V 1i (¢; t) is a (¯nite) continuous increasing function.
Assumption (ii) There exists a ¯nite investment trigger x1i (t) such that the optimal
stopping time ¿1i (t) of problem (2) is written as the threshold strategy:
¿1i (t) = inffs ¸ t j Xi(s) 2 S1i (s) = [x1i (s);1)g: (3)
We restrict our attention to a continuous di®usion X(t) satisfying the assumptions above.
In addition, as in the related papers, we assume nonnegativeness of X(t) as follows.
Assumption (iii) Xi(t) is nonnegative. If Xi(s) = 0 for any s, Xi(t) = 0 for all t ¸ s.
The assumptions are not restrictive. In fact, we can take a wide range of di®usions
including a GBM, i.e., (1) with ¹i(Xi(t); t) = ¹iXi(t), ¾i(Xi(t); t) = ¾iXi(t) where ¹i(< r)
and ¾i(> 0) are constant, and a mean-reverting process (1) with ¹i(Xi(t); t) = ´( ¹X ¡
Xi(t)), ¾i(Xi(t); t) = ¾iXi(t) where ´; ¹X and ¾i are positive constants.
Note that for a GBM with T = 1, V 1i (xi; t) is explicitly derived independently from
time t (see [4]). In fact, the option value V 1i (xi) is expressed as:
V 1i (xi) =
8><>:
µ
xi
x1i
¶¯i
(x1i ¡ Ii) (0 · xi < x1i )
xi ¡ Ii (xi ¸ x1i ):
(4)
Here, x1i is the constant investment trigger de¯ned by:
x1i =
¯i
¯i ¡ 1Ii; (5)
where ¯i is the positive characteristic root:
¯i =
1
2
¡ ¹i
¾2i
+
sµ
¹i
¾2i
¡ 1
2
¶2
+
2r
¾2i
(> 1):
2.2 Duopoly with a single project
This subsection considers two symmetric ¯rms that struggle to take a single project i.
The following outcome, called \preemptive investment", is well known. For details, refer
to [6, 9, 16]. Assume that the initial value satis¯es Xi(0) · I.
We can solve the game between the ¯rms backward. We begin by supposing that one
of the ¯rms (called the leader) has ¯rst invested at time t(· T ) with Xi(t) = xi, and
we ¯nd the optimal decision of the other (called the follower). Because the follower's
opportunity to invest is completely lost, the follower's pro¯t is 0. On the other hand,
the leader's pro¯t is xi ¡ Ii. In the situation where neither ¯rm has invested, each ¯rm
attempts to preempt the other in order to obtain the leader's payo® if Xi(t) ¡ Ii > 0.
As a result, in the preemptive equilibrium, both ¯rms attempt to invest at the zero-NPV
time:
¿2i = infft ¸ 0 j Xi(t)¡ Ii = 0g (6)
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and gain no project value:
V 2i (xi; t) = 0: (7)
Recall that the superscript 2 and the subscript i represent duopoly with a single project
i.
Strictly speaking, both ¯rms' investment strategy at (6) proves to be a Nash equilib-
rium in the stopping game formulated under the appropriate assumption.7 The outcome
can be interpreted to mean that the leading ¯rm invests at (6), but the follower cannot
conduct a project. The leader's pro¯t is also zero because of investing too early. This is
a well-known preemptive equilibrium in the strategic real options literature (refer to [9]).
2.3 Monopoly with two alternative projects
This subsection considers a ¯rm that has a monopolistic option to invest a single project
among projects 1; 2. The model applies to the situation where a ¯rm cannot execute
both projects for a reason such as budget constraint. The problem has been essentially
investigated in [5] and Section 6 in [3]. In contrast, [2] investigated investment with
di®erent scales under a one-dimensional state variable, i.e., the case where ½ = 1; X1(0) 6=
X2(0) and I1 6= I2.
The option value at time t(· T ) with Xi(t) = xi is equal to the value function of the
optimal stopping problem as follows:
V 11;2(x; t) = sup
¿2Tt
Ext [e¡r(¿¡t)max
i=1;2
(Xi(¿)¡ Ii)1f¿·Tg]: (8)
Recall that V 11;2 in (8) means the value function in monopoly with projects 1; 2.
The optimal stopping time ¿11;2 in problem (8) becomes:
¿11;2(t) = inffs ¸ t j X(s) 2 S11;2(s)g; (9)
where the stopping region S11;2(s) is de¯ned by:
S11;2(s) = fx 2 R2+ j V 11;2(x; s) = max
i=1;2
(xi ¡ Ii)g: (10)
The stopping region S11;2(t) proves to be the union of two disjoint convex sets corresponding
to the immediate investment region of each project when X(t) follows a GBM (refer to
Section 6 in [3] and Figure 3 in Section 3.2).
Let us now focus on two symmetric projects, i.e., ¹1 = ¹2; ¾1 = ¾2 and I1 = I2. In
this case, the larger the correlation coe±cient ½, the more likely it is that pro¯ts X1(t)
and X2(t) take close values. Then the option value V 11;2 decreases and the stopping region
S11;2(t) enlarges with the correlation. This can be explained in terms of a decrease of
7This assumption is that if two ¯rms choose the same timing, one of the ¯rms is chosen as the leader with
probability 1=2. Most studies, including [6, 16], are built on this assumption.
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diversi¯cation e®ects. In particular, in the case of the perfect correlation, i.e., ½ = 1,
the option value V 11;2 and the investment time ¿
1
1;2 for x1 = x2, agree with those in a
monopoly with a single project, i.e., V 1i and ¿
1
i , respectively. The e®ect of a correlation
will be compared in detail with that in a duopoly with two projects in Section 3.
The next section is the main contribution of the paper. Although the results can be
extended in the case of n ¯rms with m projects in Section 3.3, I ¯rst present the details
of a duopoly with two projects in order to avoid unnecessary confusion.
3 Several ¯rms with several alternative projects
3.1 Duopoly with two alternative projects
This subsection investigates two symmetric ¯rms that compete for one of two projects
1; 2. Assume that the one that ¯rst invests (the leader) can choose the better project
while the other (the follower) loses the opportunity to invest in that project. The leader's
advantage of being able to choose the better project brings about preemptive competition
between the ¯rms. As mentioned in Section 1, the model has a wide range of applications,
such as preemption in the new market and M&A struggles. Relevant to this model,
[12] investigated a duopoly with two projects following a one-dimensional state variable.
Assume Xi(0) · Ii (i = 1; 2).
As in Section 2.2, the problem can be solved in a reverse manner. Suppose that the
leader has ¯rst invested in the better project i(t) at time t(· T ) with X(t) = x, where
the function i(t)8 is de¯ned by:
i(t) = k if Xk(t)¡ Ik = max
i=1;2
(Xi(t)¡ Ii): (11)
Under this assumption, we ¯nd the optimal response of the follower. Because for i 6= i(t)
the follower has the monopolistic option to invest in a single project i, the option value
and the optimal investment timing coincide with V 1i , ¿
1
i (see (2) and (3)), respectively.
On the other hand, the leader's payo® is equal to maxi=1;2(Xi(t)¡ Ii).
Let us return to the situation where neither ¯rm has invested. The region S2F1;2(t)
where the leader's pro¯t dominates that of the follower is:
S2F1;2(t) = fx1 ¡ I1 ¸ V 12 (x2; t)g [ fx2 ¡ I2 ¸ V 11 (x1; t)g:
Each ¯rm attempts to preempt the competitor as long as X(t) 2 S2F1;2(t). In addition, one
of the ¯rms reluctantly invests X(t) 2 S11 (t) [ S12 (t) if it knows that the other invests at
time:
¿2F1;2 = infft ¸ 0 j X(t) 2 @S2F1;2(t)g; (12)
8We do not have to be concerned about the value of i(t) when X1(t)¡ I1 = X2(t)¡ I2.
6
where @S2F1;2(t) denotes the boundary of S2F1;2(t). This is because for X(t) 2 S11 (t) [ S12 (t)
immediate investment generates a higher pro¯t than the option value to wait until ¿2F1;2
(this will be shown in the proof of Proposition 1). Therefore, the preemptive investment
region S21;2(t) becomes:
S21;2(t) = fx1 ¡ I1 ¸ V 12 (x2; t)g [ fx2 ¡ I2 ¸ V 11 (x1; t)g [ S11 (t) [ S12 (t): (13)
The preemptive investment takes place at:
¿21;2 = infft ¸ 0 j X(t) 2 @S21;2(t)g; (14)
where @S21;2(t) denotes the boundary of S21;2(t) which consists of three parts, i.e.:
@S21;2(t) = fxi · x1i0(t)¡ Ii0 + Ii; xi ¡ Ii = V 1i0 (xi0 ; t)g| {z }
(a)
[fxi0 · x1i0(t); xi0 ¡ Ii0 = V 1i (xi; t)g| {z }
(b)
[fxi0 = x1i0(t); (V 1i )¡1(x1i0(t)¡ Ii0) · xi · x1i0(t)¡ Ii0 + Iig| {z }
(c)
; (15)
for i such that:
x1i (t)¡ Ii ¸ x1i0(t)¡ Ii0 ; (16)
where i0 denotes project i0 6= i throughout the paper.
Figure 1 illustrates the preemptive investment boundary @S21;2(t). The ¯rst part (a)
is the region where the leader's investment in project i generates the same value as the
follower's option value to invest in project i0. In the second part (b), both ¯rms are
indi®erent to being the leader with project i0 and the follower with project i. In the last
part (c), both ¯rms prefer to be the follower with project i to being the leader with project
i0 due to X(t) =2 S2F1;2(t). However, one of the ¯rms invests ¯rst if it knows that the other
does not invest until ¿2F1;2 (t). It must be noted that, unlike the monopolist investment
region, the preemptive investment boundary @S21;2(t) is independent of the correlation
coe±cient ½.
The option value (of the leader) at time t(· min(T; ¿21;2)) with X(t) = x is written as:
V 21;2(x; t) = Ext [e
¡r(¿21;2¡t)max
i=1;2
(Xi(¿21;2)¡ Ii)]: (17)
The leader's advantage of choosing the better project is completely lost by its earlier
investment than the optimal timing. Furthermore, the leader's pro¯t becomes less than
that of the follower if and only if the process X(t) hits part (c).
Although so far we intuitively see the preemptive outcome, to do a more precise
derivation we formulate the following stopping game by two symmetric ¯rms j = 1; 2.
De¯ne the action space of both ¯rms as follows:
A = f(¿; i) j ¿ 2 T0; i : F¿measurable random variable taking values in f0; 1gg:
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 1: The preemptive investment boundary @S21;2(t)
De¯ne the ¯rm 1's payo® ¼1 as:
¼1(¿1; i1; ¿2; i2) = E[1f¿1<¿2ge
¡r¿1(Xi1(¿1)¡ Ii1) + 1f¿1>¿2ge¡r¿2V 1i02(Xi02(¿2); ¿2)
+1f¿1=¿2g
e¡r¿1
2
(Xi1(¿1)¡ Ii1 + V 1i02(Xi02(¿2); ¿2))]; (18)
where (¿1; i1) and (¿2; i2) in ¼1(¿1; i1; ¿2; i2) denote the strategies of ¯rm 1 and 2, respec-
tively. The last term of (18) corresponds to the assumption in footnote 7. We also de¯ne
the payo® of ¯rm 2 as ¼2 symmetrically.
We wish to ¯nd a Nash equilibrium in the stopping game, i.e., ( ~¿1; ~i1; ~¿2; ~i2) 2 A £A
satisfying both:
¼1( ~¿1; ~i1; ~¿2; ~i2) = max
(¿1;i1)2A
¼1(¿1; i1; ~¿2; ~i2); (19)
and
¼2( ~¿1; ~i1; ~¿2; ~i2) = max
(¿2;i2)2A
¼2( ~¿1; ~i1; ¿2; i2): (20)
Let ¿21;2(t) denote (14), replacing initial time 0 with t. We assume that the di®usion
process X(t) satis¯es the following condition9:
Assumption (iv)
max
i=1;2
(xi ¡ Ii) · Ext [e¡r(¿
2
1;2(t)¡t)max
i=1;2
(Xi(¿21;2(t))¡ Ii)] (x =2 S21;2(t)):
9I do not know any proof, but the assumption is satis¯ed in many cases as far as I can judge from a wide
range of computations. Even if Assumption (iv) is not satis¯ed, the violation is so small that we can regard the
outcome as an approximate equilibrium.
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The next proposition shows that the intuitive equilibrium above is indeed a Nash equilib-
rium in the stopping game.
Proposition 1 The pair of strategies (¿212; i(¿
2
12); ¿
2F
12 ; i(¿
2F
12 )) is a Nash equilibrium in
the stopping game, where the stopping times ¿212; ¿
2F
12 are de¯ned by (14),(12), and the
functions i(¿212); i(¿
2F
12 ) are de¯ned by (11), respectively.
Proof To simplify the notations, let ~¿1 = ¿212; ~i1 = i(¿
2
12); ~¿2 = ¿
2F
12 ; ~i2 = i(¿
2F
12 ). Recall
that ~i2
0 denotes project ~i2
0 6= ~i2. Take an arbitrary (¿1; i1) 2 A. We calculate:
¼1(¿1; i1; ~¿2; ~i2)
= E[1f¿1< ~¿2ge
¡r¿1(Xi1(¿1)¡ Ii1) + 1f¿1> ~¿2ge¡r ~¿2V 1~i20(X ~i20( ~¿2); ~¿2)
+1f¿1= ~¿2g
e¡r¿1
2
(Xi1(¿1)¡ Ii1 + V 1~i20(X ~i20( ~¿2); ~¿2))]
· E[1f¿1< ~¿2ge¡r¿1 maxi=1;2(Xi(¿1)¡ Ii) + 1f¿1¸ ~¿2ge
¡r ~¿2 max
i=1;2
(Xi( ~¿2)¡ Ii)] (21)
= sup
¿12T0;¿1· ~¿2
E[e¡r¿1 max
i=1;2
(Xi(¿1)¡ Ii)]
= E[e¡r ~¿1(X ~i1( ~¿1)¡ I ~i1)] (22)
= ¼1( ~¿1; ~i1; ~¿2; ~i2)
where (21) results from V 1
~i2
0(X ~i20( ~¿2); ~¿2) = maxi=1;2(Xi( ~¿2) ¡ Ii) and (22) is proved as
follows.
By Assumption (iv), immediate investment is not optimal for X(t) = x =2 S21;2(t).
On the other hand, immediate investment is optimal for X(t) = x 2 S21;2(t) n S2F1;2(t)
(the triangle-like region in Figure 1). In fact, for any ¿1 < ~¿2, maxk=1;2(Xk(¿1) ¡ Ik) ·
V 1i (Xi(¿1); ¿1) (i = 1; 2) because of X(¿1) =2 S2F1;2(¿1). Then, for i0 satisfying (16) we have:
sup
¿12Tt;¿1· ~¿2
Ext [e¡r(¿1¡t) max
k=1;2
(Xk(¿1)¡ Ik)] · Ext [e¡r(¿1¡t)V 1i0 (Xi0(¿1); ¿1)]
· V 1i0 (x; t) (23)
= xi0 ¡ Ii0 ;
where (23) follows from the supermartingale property of the discounted price process
e¡rtV 1k (Xk(t); t). Thus, (22) (and hence (19)) has been proved. We can similarly show
(20) under Assumption (iv). ¤
Proposition 1 includes the results in a duopoly with a single project. In fact, if
Xi(0) = xi > Xi0(0) = 0 the preemptive equilibrium in Proposition 1 agrees with that
in Section 2.2. For most of the di®usion process Xi(t), higher volatility ¾i brings about
later investment ¿1i and higher option value V
1
i . In such a case, by (13) the preemptive
investment region S21;2 becomes smaller, which leads to later investment ¿21;2 and a higher
option value V 21;2. That is to say, the e®ects of volatility ¾i in a duopoly are inherited
from a monopoly.
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If X(t) follows a GBM and T =1, we have an explicit form of the time homogeneous
investment boundary @S21;2 by (4), (5) and (15) .
Corollary 1 Assume that T = 1, ¹i(Xi(t); t) = ¹iXi(t), and ¾i(Xi(t); t) = ¾iXi(t),
where ¹i(< r) and ¾i(> 0) are constant for i = 1; 2. For all t > 0, the preemptive
investment boundary @S21;2 is:
@S21;2 =
(
xi · x1i0 ¡ I 0i + Ii; xi ¡ Ii =
µ
xi0
x1i0
¶¯1
(x1i0 ¡ Ii0)
)
[
(
xi0 · x1i0 ; xi0 ¡ Ii0 =
µ
xi
x1i
¶¯1
(x1i ¡ Ii)
)
[©xi0 = x1i0 ; (V 1i )¡1(x1i0 ¡ Ii0) · xi · x1i0 ¡ Ii0 + Iiª ;
where i satis¯es (16).
The explicit derivation of the investment boundary @S21;2 would be a big bene¯t in
applications of the model. Although the option value V 21;2 (see (17)) becomes the solution
of the corresponding partial di®erential equation with boundary @S21;2 instead of an explicit
form, I would like to emphasize that the results are quite useful for applications.
For a general di®usion process X(t) we can show the following properties of the in-
vestment region S21;2, the timing ¿21;2, and the option value V 21;2.
Proposition 2 The following relationships hold.
Investment Region
S11;2(t) ½ S1i (t) ½ S21;2(t); (24)
Investment Timing
¿21;2 · ¿1i · ¿11;2; (25)
Option Value
0 = V 2i (xi; t) · V 21;2(x; t) · V 1i (xi; t) · V 11;2(x; t): (26)
for all i = 1; 2.
Proof I prove only V 21;2(x; t) · V 1i (xi; t) (i = 1; 2) because the others are clear (from
Figure 1). We have maxk=1;2(Xk(¿21;2) ¡ Ik) · V 1i (Xi(¿21;2); ¿21;2) (i = 1; 2), because of
Xi(¿21;2) =2 S2F1;2(¿21;2) n @S2F1;2(¿21;2). Then we calculate (17):
V 21;2(x; t) · Ext [e¡r(¿
2
1;2¡t)V 1i (Xi(¿
2
1;2); ¿
2
1;2)]
· V 1i (xi; t); (27)
where (27) follows from the supermartingale property of the discounted price process
e¡rtV 1i (Xi(t); t). ¤
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The point of Proposition 2 is that preemptive investment in a duopoly with two
projects is less e±cient than investment in a monopoly with a single project (needless
to say, than that in monopoly with two projects). In other words, the preemptive com-
petition becomes more severe if the numbers of both ¯rms and projects increase by the
same amount. This result is consistent with both the theoretical and empirical results in
previous studies (cf. [7, 14]). We can say that the result extends previous ¯nding in the
sense that the model considers the follower's choice of an alternative project.
Let us consider two symmetric projects with the same initial value x1 = x2. We focus
on the correlation coe±cient ½. In the sensitivity analysis in the model, this correlation is
the most important because the previous strategic models with a one-dimensional state
variable cannot reveal its e®ects. For example, what happens if the pro¯ts X1(t) and
X2(t) are perfectly correlated, i.e., ½ = 1? In that case, no preemption occurs because
the two projects generate the same pro¯t. Indeed, the preemptive investment timing ¿21;2
and the option value V 21;2 (see (14) and (17)) coincide with ¿
1
i and V
1
i in monopoly with
a single project, respectively. Taking this and (26) into account, we can easily show the
following corollary.
Corollary 2 Consider the symmetric projects with x1 = x2. The following equalities
hold for the correlation coe±cient ½:
max
½2[¡1;1]
V 21;2(x; t) = V
1
i (xi; t) = min
½2[¡1;1]
V 11;2(x; t) (i = 1; 2); (28)
where ½ = 1 gives the maximum of V 21;2(x; t) and the minimum of V
1
1;2(x; t).
It should be noted that in a duopoly the option value V 21;2(x; t), unlike the investment
boundary @S21;2(t) (see (15)), depends on the correlation coe±cient ½. Recall that in a
monopoly a weaker correlation increases the option value by diversi¯cation. In contrast,
in a duopoly a stronger correlation increases the strategic option value by moderation
of the preemptive competition. The preemptive competition is moderated by a stronger
correlation because the leader's advantage of project choice is reduced. This result is
consistent with frequent takeovers in the pharmaceutical industry where there are uncor-
related potential targets.
3.2 Numerical examples
This subsection presents numerical examples of the results. Assume that X(t) follows a
symmetric GBM. I set the same base parameter values as [3]:
r = 6%; ¹1 = ¹2 = 0%; ¾1 = ¾2 = 20%; I1 = I2 = 100;
which are also similar to those of [5]. All option values are computed for the initial point
x(t) = (100; 100).
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Figure 2 illustrates the investment boundaries @S21;2(t), 6 months, 1 year, 5 years,
and 10 years before maturity. The investment boundary is composed of two parts (a)
and (b) with a vertex on (x11(t); x
1
2(t)) which is a pair of the investment triggers in a
monopoly with a single project.10 Needless to say, the investment region becomes larger
as time to maturity. This implies that the option value increases with time to maturity.
In fact, the option values 6 months, 1 year, 5 years, and 10 years before maturity are
V 21;2 = 3:72; 5:15; 9:83; and 12:16, respectively.
Let us now examine the e®ects of the correlation coe±cient ½, which is the most
interesting feature in the model. Fix time to maturity as 1 year. Figure 3 depicts the
investment boundary @S21;2(t) in a duopoly with those of a monopoly with two projects,
i.e., @S11;2(t). The investment boundary in a duopoly, unlike that of a monopoly, is
independent of the correlation. We see from Figure 3 that the investment region in a
monopoly becomes smaller with the correlation. In other words, the monopolistic option
value decreases with the diversi¯cation e®ects.
Table 1 presents the option values and percentages for a range of correlation coe±cients
½. The option value V 21;2 in a duopoly increases to V
1
i = 7:15 with ½, while the option
value V 11;2 in a monopoly drops to V
1
i = 7:15, as shown in the previous subsection. For a
reasonable correlation ½ = ¡0:2 » 0:8 the option value in a duopoly is 40% » 60% of the
monopolist with two projects, or equivalently 70% » 80% of the monopolist with a single
project.
It should be noted that the results concerning the percentages V 21;2=V
1
1;2; V
2
1;2=V
1
i are
robust for time to maturity T , drift ¹, and volatility ¾. For example, for ½ = 0, the option
value 10 years before maturity is V 21;2 = 12:16, which is more than twice that of Table
1, while the percentages are V 21;2=V
1
1;2 = 42:72%; V
2
1;2=V
1
i = 74:73%. The option value
and the percentages for volatility ¾ = 0:5 and ½ = 0 are V 21;2 = 12:32 and V
2
1;2=V
1
1;2 =
38:87%; V 21;2=V
1
i = 69:99%, respectively.
In a valuation of a project by a real options approach, it sometimes occurs that a
monopolistic model and strategic model generate polar valuations, namely, the value in
the former is too high while that in the latter becomes too low. Then, a substantial
problem for a practitioner arises. How can we judge the gap and which value is reliable?
The model of the paper would provide us with a useful criterion in such a case. That
is, we should evaluate the value of a project considering a potential alternative using the
methodology of this paper.
10All computations in the paper use a bivariate version of the lattice binomial method with 500 time steps,
and hence the discretization is rougher for longer times to maturity.
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Table 1: Option values.
½ V 21;2 V
1
1;2 V
2
1;2=V
1
1;2 V
2
1;2=V
1
i
¡0:4 4:99 13:41 37:27% 69:85%
¡0:2 5:06 12:99 38:99% 70:78%
0 5:15 12:51 41:18% 72:01%
0:2 5:26 11:97 43:99% 73:6%
0:4 5:41 11:34 47:75% 75:7%
0:6 5:62 10:58 53:17% 78:64%
0:8 5:96 9:57 62:27% 83:33%
1 7:15 7:15 100% 100%
X1(t)
X 2
(t)
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Figure 2: The preemptive boundary @S21;2(t), 0:5; 1; 5, and 10 years before maturity.
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Figure 3: The investment boundary @S21;2(t) and @S11;2(t) for ½ = 0; 0:4, and 0:8.
3.3 n ¯rms with m alternative projects
This subsection extends the results in Section 3.2 to an oligopoly of n ¯rms with m
alternative projects. Assume that:
Xi(0) · Ii (i = 1; 2; : : : ;m): (29)
As in Section 3.2, we can solve the problem backward. We restrict our attention to the
case of symmetric projects to avoid unnecessary confusion. For asymmetric projects the
preemptive investment regions include the region corresponding to part (c) in (15), but
the results below remain true.
Let us ¯rst look at a case where n · m. Consider the last two ¯rms' game among
m¡n+2 projects. Assume that at time t with X(t) = x, m¡n+2 projects in¡1; : : : ; im
remain. If one of the ¯rms (the leader) invests in project ik at time t, the follower's option
value becomes V 1
in¡1;:::; ·ik;:::;;im
(X(t); t), where ·ik denotes the exclusion of ik. Recall that
the superscript and the subscript represent the number of ¯rms and the available projects,
respectively.
Then, the region where the leader's payo® exceeds the follower's, denoted by S2in¡1;:::;im(t),
is:
S2in¡1;:::;im(t) = [k=n¡1;:::;mfxik ¡ Iik ¸ V 1in¡1;:::; ·ik;:::;;im(x; t)g: (30)
Under the assumption that:
X(t) = x =2 S2in¡1;:::;im(t); (31)
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both ¯rms attempt to invest at the preemptive time:11
¿2in¡1;:::;im(t) = inffs ¸ t j X(s) 2 @S2in¡1;:::;im(s)g
and gain the option value:
V 2in¡1;:::;im(x; t) = E
x
t [e
¡r(¿2in¡1;:::;im (t)¡t) max
k=n¡1;:::;m
(Xik(¿
2
in¡1;:::;im(t))¡ Iik)]:
It is readily veri¯ed from (30) that the investment region S2in¡1;:::;im(t) has the relationship:
S1in¡1;:::;im(t) ½ S1in¡1;:::; ·ik;:::;im(t) ½ S
2
in¡1;:::;im(t)
for any k (cf. (24)). Thus we have:
¿2in¡1;:::;im(t) · ¿1in¡1;:::; ·ik;:::;im(t) · ¿
1
in¡1;:::;im(t)
with respect to the timing (cf. (25)) and:
V 2
in¡1;:::; ·ik;:::;im
(x; t) · V 2in¡1;:::;im(x; t) · V 1in¡1;:::; ·ik;:::;im(x; t) · V
1
in¡1;:::;im(x; t)
with respect to the value (cf. (26)).
Next let us turn back to the 3 ¯rm game among projects in¡2; : : : ; im at time t with
X(t) = x. If one of the ¯rms (the leader) invests in project ik at time t, the two followers'
option value becomes V 2
in¡2;:::; ·ik;:::;im
(X(t); t) derived under assumption (31) earlier.
The region where the leader has the advantage of preemption, denoted by S3in¡2;:::;im(t),
is:
S3in¡2;:::;im(t) = [k=n¡2;:::;mfxik ¡ Iik ¸ V 2in¡2;:::; ·ik::::;im(xik ; t)g (32)
Under the assumption that:
X(t) = x =2 S3in¡2;:::;im(t);
all the ¯rms attempt to invest at the preemptive time:
¿3in¡2;:::;im(t) = inffs ¸ t j X(s) 2 @S3in¡2;:::;im(s)g
and gain the option value:
V 3in¡2;:::;im(t) = E
x
t [e
¡r(¿3in¡2;:::;im (t)¡t) max
k=n¡2;:::;m
(Xik(¿
3
in¡2;:::;im(t))¡ Iik)]:
Note that the state variable X(¿3in¡2;:::;im(t)) satis¯es (31) necessary at the initial point in
the duopoly game.
It readily follows from (32) that the relationship:
S2in¡2;:::;im(t) ½ S2in¡2;:::; ·ik;:::;im(t) ½ S
3
in¡2;:::;im(t)
11To be precise, similar assumptions to footnote 7 and Assumption (iv) are necessary.
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hold for any k. By this we have:
¿3in¡2;:::;im(t) · ¿2in¡2;:::; ·ik;:::;im(t) · ¿
2
in¡2;:::;im(t)
and
V 3
in¡2;:::; ·ik;:::;im
(x; t) · V 3in¡2;:::;im(x; t) · V 2in¡2;:::; ·ik;:::;im(x; t) · V
2
in¡2;:::;im(x; t):
By backward induction we can show the following results in n ¯rms' game at time 0
with Xi(0) = xi < Ii (i = 1; 2; : : : ;m). The preemptive investment region Sn1;:::;m(t), the
preemptive timing ¿n1;:::;m, and the option value V
n
1;:::;m(x; t) are:
Sn1;:::;m(t) = [k=1;:::;mfxik ¡ Iik ¸ V n¡11;:::;·k;:::;m(xk; t)g;
¿n1;:::;m = infft ¸ 0 j X(t) 2 @S3i1;:::;m(t)g;
and
V n1;:::;m(x; t) = Ext [e
¡r(¿n1;:::;m¡t) max
k=1;:::;m
(Xk(¿n1;:::;m)¡ Ik)];
respectively. The following relationships and inequalities hold:
Sn¡11;:::;m(t) ½ Sn¡11;:::;·k;:::;m(t) ½ S
n
1;:::;m(t);
¿n1;:::;m(t) · ¿n¡11;:::;·k;:::;m(t) · ¿
n¡1
1;:::;m(t);
and
V n
1;:::;·k;:::;m
(x; t) · V n1;:::;m(x; t) · V n¡11;:::;·k;:::;m(x; t) · V
n¡1
1;:::;m(x; t):
The results are a generalization of Proposition 2. Again, the point is that the preemptive
competition intensi¯es if the numbers of both ¯rms and projects increase by the same
amount. It is intuitively explained that in the preemptive equilibrium all the ¯rms are
dragged into a scenario with the worst project.
Let us focus on the symmetric projects with the same initial value. The perfect
correlation gives V 11 (x; t) in a monopoly with a single project. For n = m, as in Corollary
2, V 11 (x; t) agrees with the maximum of V
n
1;:::;n(x; t). On the other hand, it does not
necessarily hold for n < m. This is because the last ¯rm's monopolistic value V 1in;:::;im(x; t)
decreases with the correlation. Generally, the sensitivity of the correlation in an oligopoly
depends on a trade-o® between moderation of the preemptive competition (positive e®ect)
and a decrease in a value of project choice (negative e®ect).
In the case where the number of ¯rms is larger than that of projects, i.e., n > m, it
can be easily shown that at each stage all the remaining ¯rms attempt to invest with the
zero-NPV timing and hence obtain nothing. The outcome is precisely the same as that
in Section 2.2.
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4 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the preemptive equilibrium in a real options model with
the multidimensional state variable, which represents potential alternative projects. The
results are summarized as follows.
First, preemptive investment takes place earlier and the option value becomes lower
if the numbers of both ¯rms and projects increase by the same amount. The result can
be regarded as extension of the previous results with a one-dimensional state variable as
well as being consistent with empirical ¯ndings.
Second, the preemptive competition is moderated by the correlation among pro¯ts
from projects. The e®ect contrasts with that in a monopoly where a strong correlation
decreases the value of project choice. The sensitivity of the correlation to the project value
in an oligopoly depends on a trade-o® between moderation of the preemptive competition
and a decrease in the value of project choice.
Third, the strategic option values with a symmetric alternative is 40% » 60% of a
monopoly with two alternative projects, or equivalently 70% » 80% of a monopoly with
a single project. This indicates the importance of the existence of a potential alternative.
Although monopolistic and strategic models with a one-dimensional state variable tend
to calculate extreme values, the method in this paper allows a reasonable valuation taking
account of the follower's potential alternative investment.
Lastly, I should point out important but di±cult topics for future research. The paper
assumes that pro¯ts from the projects are not sensitive to a competitor's alternative
investment. However, the leader's cash °ow could be a®ected by the follower's initiation
of a project even if it is an alternative project that is di®erent from the leader's project.
Also, the projects may have di®erent maturity in some cases.
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